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REAL PROPERTY
I.

RIGHTS IN LAND

All too often the expansive concepts of private and public rights
in land are tremendous frictions working against each other generating complex legal problems. Ensuing litigation invariably involves a confrontation between "compelling public interest" on the
one hand, and a private landowner's right to freely use his property
on the other. Such a conflict was recently resolved in a landmark
decision by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Just v. Marinette
Cbunty' which prefaces this section on "Rights in Land."
Just established the right of the state to restrict private land use
in order to protect shoreland ecology. At issue, in Just, was the
public interest in stopping the despoliation of natural resources
versus the landowners asserted right to use their property contrary
to an approved zoning ordinance.
In April of 1961 the plaintiff-appellants, Ronald and Kathryn
Just, purchased a large tract of land along the north shore of a
navigable lake in Marinette County. The controversy involved a
remaining portion of the original purchase described as verdant
land bordering the lake and extending back six-hundred feet. Over
the years the Justs developed and sold parcels of land out of the
original tract. Several years after their purchase Marinette
County's Shoreland Zoning Ordinance Number 24 was adopted
and put into effect.' This ordinance placed the Justs' remaining
property within a conservancy district which, inter alia, required a
conditional use permit be obtained from the zoning administrator
of the county before fill could be added to "wetlands." 3 Six
I. 56 Wis. 2d 7,201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
2. The ordinance became effective October 9, 1967 and is patterned after the model
ordinance published by the Wisconsin Department of Resource Development in July of
1967. See. Kusler, Water Quality Protectionfor Inland Lakes in Wisconsin: A Comprehensive Approach to Water Pollution, 1970 Wis. L. REV. 35, 62-63.
The basic purpose of the ordinance is to protect navigable waters and the public rights
therein from the degredation and deterioration which results from uncontrolled use and
development of shorelands. This public purpose is more definitively stated in §§ 1.2 and 1.3
of the ordinance wherein it considers uncontrolled use ofishorelands and pollution of navigable waters to have an adverse effect upon public health, safety, convenience and general
welfare while also impairing the tax base. 56 Wis. 2d at 10, 210 N.W.2d at 765. See also,
Ws. STAT. § 59.971 (I) (1971) and Whipple, The Necessity of Zoning Variance or Amendments Notice to the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources Under the Shoreland
Zoning and Navigable Waters Protection Act, 57 MARQ. L. REv. 25 (1973).
3. Because this land was located within 1000 feet of the normal high water elevation of
the lake it was denominated a wetland under § 2.29 of the ordinance and its use became
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months after the ordinance went into effect the Justs added sand
fill to their remaining property without first securing the required
permit. This violation occasioned the trial court's granting of a
mandatory injunction sought by Marinette County restraining the
Justs from placing fill upon their property.4
The arguments presented in Just raised constitutional issues
and resulted in a holding novel to Wisconsin case law. Simply put,
the controversy concerned whether or not the conservancy provisions of the ordinance placing restrictions upon wetland-filling was
constitutional because it amounted to a constructive taking of the
Justs' land without compensation. 5 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
held that the restriction imposed upon such use was a valid exercise
of police power and that the effect of the ordinance was not unconstitutional. The .court's opinion further noted the validity of governmental zoning authority in restricting the use of a citizen's
property to prevent a public harm resulting from any change in the
natural character of the land.' In affirming the trial court's granting of an injunction and upholding the constitutionality of the
ordinance the court said:
An owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right to change

the essential natural character of his land so as to use it for a
purpose for which it was unsuited in its natural state and which
injures the rights of others. The exercise of police power, in
zoning, must be reasonable and we think it is not an unreasonable exercise of that power to prevent harm to public 7rights by
limiting the use of private property to its natural uses.

This holding reflects the obvious change in an aroused public's
attitude toward the preservation of natural resources. Due to the
recognized interrelationship of the natural environment of the
shorelands to the purity of the contiguous waters the individual's
use of shoreland suddenly has become the public's concern manifesting itself through the state's trusteeship under the trust doc8
trine.
subject to county control.

4. 56 Wis. 2d at 9, 201 N.W.2d at 766.
5. Id. at 14, 201 N.W.2d at 767.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 17, 201 N.W.2d at 768. For further discussion see n. 47 et seq., infra.
8. The Just holding has already been applied by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Town
of Salem v. Kenosha County, 57 Wis. 2d 432, 434, 204 N.W.2d 467 (1973).
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Private Rights

Remedies
The plaintiff-appellant, in Kinzer v. Bidwell,9 purchased a lakefront lot from the respondents in 1955 along with an undivided onesixth interest in a 75 acre parcel of land. The undivided parcel was
located behind the lakefront lots owned individually by Kinzer and
the respondents, hereinafter termed the "back property." Subsequent to the conveying of the one-sixth interest to Kinzer the respondents and Kinzer deeded the back property to the First Wisconsin Trust Company to hold the property as trustee subject to the
terms of a land trust agreement. Included in the agreement was a
provision prohibiting any party from "attempting to sell or partition his interest without first offering to sell it to the other parties
at cost."'"
Kinzer occupied the property until 1968 when he put up for sale
the lakefront property and his interest in the back property. He
was successful in selling the lakefront property but was challenged
by the respondents in selling his interest in the back property. As
a result the sale of the back property was never consummated.
Kinzer then brought suit seeking a partition of the back property.
The trial court held that the trust agreement was merely "passive."
Being passive, the parties to the back property were considered
tenants in common and thus Kinzer was entitled to a partition of
his one-sixth interest."
The Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that the validity of Kinzer's common-law right to partition hinged on whether or not the
land trust agreement was "active" or "passive." An active trust
would bind the appellant as a shareholder and beneficiary to a valid
land trust agreement; unlike a passive trust which merely finds the
parties tenants in common. Differentiating between the two the
standard applied by the court is consistent with prior Wisconsin
case law and stated as follows:
I.

If there are any active duties for the [trustee] to perform with
respect to administering the property, and the primary use be
expressly or impliedly, by reason of such active duty, vested in
the trustee, the trust is necessarily active ... .
9. 55 Wis. 2d 749, 201 N.W.2d 9 (1972).
10. Id. at 750o751, 201 N.W.2d at 10.
II. Id.
12. Holmes v. Walter, 118 Wis. 409, 416, 95 N.W. 380 (1903).
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The requisite involvement of the trustee was found to be present
by the court. Management and control of the back property was
left entirely in the trustee's hands. Thus, Kinzer was not allowed a
partition and was bound by the land trust agreement. 13
Specific performance of a land contract for the purchase of
commercial property was sought in Huntoon v. Capozza. 4 The
plaintiff-respondents, William and Eleanor Huntoon, entered into
a land contract with the defendant-appellant Barbara J. Capozza
for her purchase of their restaurant-bar-apartment complex on
March 14, 1970. Payment in full was to be on or before April 1,
1973. The land contract provided that upon the vendee's default the
vendors, at their option, shall have the right to re-enter. Alternatively, the vendors were given the option of affirming the land
contract and upon default demanding that the balance outstanding
become immediately due and payable. 5
Mrs. Capozza entered into possession and enjoyment of the
premises on May 1, 1970 and for approximately ten months tendered the monthly payments pursuant to the agreement. It was in
February of 1971 that a fire extensively damaged the premises
which caused her to default on subsequent installments. The vendors caused notice to be served upon the vendee stating that the
entire balance was due and owing and in May of 1971 commenced
suit against the vendee for specific performance of the land contract. The trial court held that the vendors were entitled to specific
performance and upon the vendee's appeal the Wisconsin Supreme
Court affirmed.
Under Wisconsin law before equitable relief can be granted to
a vendor there must be a material breach of the land contract. 6
The court found that the default by the vendee was substantial
enough to allow the vendors an equitable remedy.' 7 As to the var13. Land trusts in Wisconsin have been held to be passive where the trustee had no
active duties to perform (Boyle v. Kempkin, 243 Wis. 86, 9 N.W.2d 589 (1943)) and where
the trust instrument gave management and control of the property to the beneficiaries
leaving the trustee with no duties to perform. Janura v. Fence, 261 Wis. 179, 52 N.W.2d
144 (1952). Furthermore, the Wisconsin Legislature has abolished passive trusts. See Wis.
STAT. § 701.03 (1971) originally enacted in R.S. 1849 c. 57 § 5.
14. 57 Wis. 2d 447, 204 N.W.2d 649 (1973).
15. See text accompanying n.n. 79-80 infra for additional discussion of this case.
16. 57 Wis. 2d at 452, 204 N.W.2d at 651.
17. The defendant-vendee contended that since her missed installment payments were
unintentional, being occasioned by the fire, equitable principles should allow a redemption
period. The court noted, however, that other substantial breaches had occurred including
the defendant's failure to pay real estate taxes as well as the loss of a liquor license. These
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ious equitable remedies available it has long been established in
Wisconsin that upon a breach of a land contract the vendor may
elect to sue for specific performance.' 8 This remedy is not a disaffirmance or forfeiture but rather has been traditionally considered
an affirmance of the contract. 9 Where the vendor seeks to affirm
the land contract through specific performance his recovery
amounts to only the purchase price plus his costs and disbursements. The rule as to the distribution of the proceeds from the sale
of the property is stated as follows:
In the event the property sells for a price in excess of the contract
price, the surplus belongs to the buyer, but if a deficiency results
the purchaser is liable for the deficiency."
The case of Sutter v. Department of Natural Resources"'presents an interesting twist to the Huntoon holding. Here rescission
of the contract for the sale of land was sought by the vendors.
Walter and Florence Sutter, as vendors, entered into an option
to purchase agreement with the vendees, the Department of Natural Resources (hereinafter D.N.R.). The vendees exercised the option and a local bank was selected to serve as an escrow depository.
The Sutters duly delivered a warranty deed to the bank and the
D.N.R. deposited the purchase price which was to be due and
payable upon examination of an abstract of the Sutters' title finding it marketable. Before the purchase money could be delivered
to the Sutters a dispute arose concerning the Sutters continued
presence on the property. The D.N.R. then refused release of the
purchase money until the vendors would accede to new terms unilaterally offered by the D.N.R. These new terms were substantially
at variance with the terms of the option contract. The Sutters then
gave notice to the D.N.R. that they elected to terminate the contract and commenced a suit in equity to have the contract rescinded
breaches precluded the protection equity often affords. 57 Wis. 2d at 459, 204 N.W.2d at
656. See, e.g., Martinson v. Brooks Equipment Leasing, Inc., 36 Wis. 2d 209, 223, 152
N.W.2d 845, 154 N.W.2d 353 (1967).
18. 57 Wis. 2d at 459, 204 N.W.2d at 656. See also Kallenbach v. Lake Publications,
Inc., 30 Wis. 2d 647, 142 N.W.2d 212 (1966) where the various land contract remedies upon
default are extensively discussed. In addition to specifrc performance the other remedies
available to the vendor include (a) suit at law for the unpaid purchase price, (b) declaring
the contract at an end and quieting title in the vendor, (c) ejectment, and (d) strict foreclosure.
19. 57 Wis. 2d at 459, 204 N.W.2d at 656.
20. Kallenbach, see n. 18 supra at 65 1. See also Oconto County v. Bacon, 181 Wis. 538,
195 N.W. 412 (1923).
21. 56 Wis. 2d 376, 202 N.W.2d 24 (1973).
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and the title to the property quieted in them. The trial court concluded that the new terms demanded of the vendors, after the
option was exercised by the vendees, amounted to a repudiation of
the original contract allowing the Sutters the remedy of rescission.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed.
The court found error in the trial court granting the vendors
the remedy of rescission. According to prior Wisconsin case law
rescission is unquestionably granted to the vendor where the
vendee of real estate has substantially breached his part of the
contract by not providing the required performance pursuant to the
conditions of the agreement. 21 In the instant case, however, the
court noted that the Sutters had fully executed their part of the
contract. Thus the mere fact that that the D.N.R. failed to perform
a promise bargained for under the terms of the contract did not
23
amount to a repudiation entitling the vendors to rescission.
Strong policy reasons support the above decision for to allow
a vendor of real estate to repudiate his deed and recover the land
upon the vendee's failure to pay the purchase price would render
real estate titles dangerously uncertain. 24 The nature of the
D.N.R.'s obligation to pay the purchase money was that of a
covenant of an executed contract. It was not, as the trial court held,
a condition of an executory contract for the sale of land. Since the
contract for the sale was fully executed by the vendors they would
be required to sue for breach of contract damages2 unlike Huntoon
where the contract for the sale of real estate was executory, thus
allowing the vendor an election of remedies upon breach of a
condition.
A more novel case is McLoone v. Roberts26 wherein the
plaintiff-appellant sought recovery for damages to his property
from the defendant-respondent who was filling adjoining marshland for a city redevelopment corporation. The plaintiff, after settling with the redevelopment corporation which owned the land,
sought recovery from the defendant, an independent contractor
hired by the redevelopment corporation to fill the adjoining marshland. The filling process was accomplished by means of a hydraulic
22. See, e.g., Anderson v. Nelson, 38 Wis. 2d 509, 516, 157 N.W.2d 655 (1968).
23. This holding is in accord with preceding Wisconsin case law as established in several
early decisions. See, e.g., Topping v. Parish, 96 Wis. 378, 381, 71 N.W. 367 (1897). See
also 55 AI. JUR. Vendor and Purchaser§ 620, p. 1013.
24. 56 Wis. 2d at 382, 202 N.W.2d at 27.
25. Id.
26. 58 Wis. 2d 704, 207 N.W.2d 616 (1973).
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dredging system which gathered fill material from the bottom of a
nearby river.2 7 The effect of water runoff was to change the compaction of the soil on the plaintiffs property resulting in its loss
of weight-bearing capacity cracking the floor and walls of the
plaintiff's building. Notice was given to the defendant of the damage but the dredging continued under the assumption that as more
fill was placed on the adjoining land the plaintiff's building would
be better protected. The plaintiff sued for damages and the verdict
was returned for the defendant finding that it was not negligent in
performing the dredging.
Upon appeal the plaintiff contended that the defendant dredging company should, nevertheless, be held liable as an insurer
against damage to the building under the theory of strict liability.
Noting that the courts of other jurisdictions were not in accord as
to one's liability to an adjoining landowner in the absence of negligence, the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted the following rule as
to the liability of an independent contractor to a landowner:
An independent contractor is liable for injuries caused by his own
negligence or that of his servants in the course of his performance
of the work, or his liability may be stated to be for his breach of
the standard of due, ordinary, or reasonable care. Conversely, a
contractor is not liable for an injury where he was in no way
negligent in doing the work.2
The landfilling operation in the instant case was not found, by the
court, to fall within the extraordinary risk situation to which the
doctrine of strict liability is customarily restricted. 29 With this the
Wisconsin Supreme Court denied the plaintiff a recovery under
strict liability against an independent contractor working upon
adjoining land.
2. Covenants
In an action for foreclosure of a land contract in Peterson v.
La May & Johnson" a deficiency judgment in favor of the vendors
and adverse to the purchasers and purchasers' assignees was ren27. Hydraulic dredging involves the removal of sand and silt from a river bottom and
pumping it through pipes discharging the fill in the desired areas. The large quantity of
water accumulated percolates to the surface of the fill and then is allowed to run off.
28. 58 Wis. 2d at 710-711, 207 N.W.2d at 619-620.
29. Id.; See PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS (Hornbook Series, 4th ed.), § 79, p. 518, stating:
". . in general strict liability has been confined to consequences which lie within the
extraordinary risk whose existence calls for special responsibility."
30. 56 Wis. 2d 145, 201 N.W.2d 507 (1972).
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dered by the trial court. Roy A. Peterson and his wife as vendors
and Charles Johnson and his wife as purchasers executed a land
contract on December 1, 1964 for the sale of a residence. On May
13, 1968 an assignment of the Johnsons' interest in the land contract was made to Lawrence La May and his wife. At no time did
the La Mays execute an agreement with the vendors purporting to
bind them to the terms of the original land contract. They continued, however, to make monthly installment payments on the land
contract until May 31, 1969. On June 5, 1969, the La Mays then
executed a quitclaim deed to the original purchasers, the Johnsons,
and no further payments were made after May of 1969.
The Petersons brought an action for specific performance of
the land contract against both the Johnsons and La Mays and it
was granted with the trial court overruling the La Mays' demurrer.
Upon a judicial sale a deficiency resulted which was asserted
against the La Mays. An appeal was taken by the La Mays from
that portion of the judgment which found them liable for the
deficiency.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that since the vendor of
a land contract retains legal title to the property to secure the
balance due on the purchase price upon default one of his options
is the affirming remedy of a suit for specific performance.3 ' The
vendor's right to the contract price can be satisfied out of a judicial
sale of the property and the purchaser is liable for any deficiencies
as a result of the contractual agreement." As mere assignees of
the original contract, however, the La Mays contended that they
had no personal liability for the underlying obligation to pay the
purchase price. In reversing the trial court the Wisconsin Supreme
Court agreed with the La Mays' contention that an assignment
alone does not impose personal liability upon the assignee and
33
found it to be in conformity with the great weight of authority.
The basis for this holding is the lack of contractual privity
between the vendor and the assignee of the vendee's interest. The
La Mays held a bare assignment which created a privity of estate
between them and the vendors but not a privity of contract. Since
the obligation to pay the purchase price is not a covenant running
with the land but is a personal obligation based on contract it is
only enforceable against those who have a contractual obligation
31. Id. at 147, 201 N.W.2d at 508. See also Kallenbach supra n. 18.
32. See text accompanying n. 20 supra.
33. 56 Wis. 2d at 148, 201 N.W.2d at 509.
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to pay the purchase price.3 4 The court did indicate two possible
ways an assignee could be held personally liable for the deficiency
judgment. They were (a) negotiation of a contract directly with the
vendor, creating a novation, or (b) entering into an express agreement with the purchaser assuming the contract obligations thus
making the assignee liable to the vendor under the third-party3
beneficiary theory. 1
B. Public Rights
The cases reported under this heading concern the protection
and securing of public rights in land through the use of zoning and
the exercise of eminent domain. Governmental use of these powers
results in different public rights being created in property. The
protection of public rights may be accomplished by the proper
exercise of police power through zoning ordinances. The securing
or creating of a beneficial use not presently enjoyed by the public
in property is obtained through the power of eminent domain.
Essentially zoning operates to prevent a public harm while condemnation creates a public benefit. The resulting differences markedly affect the landowner whose property is subject to these powers. Where a public benefit is created the property owner is compensated while any damage suffered by a property owner as a
result of zoning is considered incidental and no compensation is
given. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has considered the distinction between zoning and eminent domain to be a matter of the
degree of damage to the property owner. 6 The loss, then, caused
the individual property owner as a result of the government's exercise of its zoning authority must be weighed to determine if it is
more than he should bear. The rule followed by the court in determining whether a zoning ordinance may or may not be a constructive taking of property was stated in Stefan Auto Body v. State
Highway Commission as follows:
[I]f the damage is such as to be suffered by many similarly
situated and is in the nature of a restriction on the use to which
land may be put and ought to be borne by the individual as a
member of society for the good of the public safety, health or
general welfare, it is said to be a reasonable exercise of police
power, but if the damage is so great to the individual that he
34. Id. at 149, 201 N.W.2d at 509.
35. Id., See text accompanying n.n. 81-82 infra for a further discussion of this case.
36. Just v. Marinette County, see supra n. I.
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ought not to bear it under contemporary standards, then the

courts are inclined to treat it as a "taking" of the property or an
unreasonable exercise of the police power.37

This rule is widely applied in zoning and eminent domain disputes as the following cases illustrate.
1. Zoning
The Just"8 case upheld the Marinette County shoreland zoning
ordinance as being a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance
restricting the use of shoreland property was considered a reasonable exercise of police power well within the ambit of zoning authority since a public harm was prevented by limiting the use of private
property to its "natural uses. 139 The public harm sought to be
prevented was the change in the natural character of the shoreland
causing a disruption to the indigenous surroundings. According to
the Wisconsin Supreme Court the preventative effect of the zoning
ordinance preserves nature as "created and to which the people
have a present right."4
When a city is incorporated and until such time as a comprehensive zoning plan is prepared what zoning is proper to restrict
and regulate property use? Such a situation was presented in City
of New Berlin v. Stein" where the city sought to perpetually restrain the defendant from accumulating junk and operating a dump
contrary to the city's municipal code. The property in question was
acquired in April of 1960 and previously had been zoned agricultural by the town of New Berlin. By operation of law the city, upon
its incorporation in February of 1959, adopted the town of New
Berlin's zoning ordinance 2 and shortly thereafter, with some
amendments, enacted what was entitled an "Interim (city) Zoning
Ordinance." Under this ordinance, enacted in May of 1959, the
37. 21 Wis. 2d 363, 369-370, 124 N.W.2d 319, 323 (1963).
38. See supra n.I.
39. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in commenting on natural uses said:

This is not a case where an owner is prevented from using his land for natural and
indigenous uses. The uses consistent with the nature of the land are allowed and other
uses recognized and still others permitted by special permit. . .. [n]othing this court
has said or held in prior cases indicate that destroying the natural character of a
swamp or a wetland so as to make that location available for human habitation is a
reasonable use of that land when the new use, although of a more economical value
to the owner, causes a harm to the general public.
56 Wis. 2d at 17-18, 201 N.W.2d at 768.
40. 56 Wis. 2d at 23-24, 201 N.W.2d at 771.
41. 58 Wis. 2d 417, 206 N.W.2d 207 (1973).
42. WIs. STAT. § 62.06 (8) (1957) repealed Wis. Laws 1959, ch. 261, § 4.
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zoning and use restrictions on the defendant's premises remained
agricultural.
The defendant claimed that the interim zoning ordinance
lapsed in May of 1961 and until the city adopted its comprehensive
zoning ordinance in June of 1962 there was no valid ordinance in
effect. Thus he would have a lawful non-conforming use upon the
adoption of the June, 1962 zoning ordinance.43 His defense was
based upon section 62.23 (7) (da) of the Wisconsin Statutes (1957)
which section is entitled "Interim Zoning." According to the provisions of this section interim zoning is only to be effective for two
years.4 The court, however, indicated that the term "Interim Zoning" as used by the city in its 1959 enactment was erroneous because the resolution specifically provided that the town of New
Berlin's ordinance would remain in full force and effect until modified or repealed. 45 The city thus had, in the court's view, adopted
an intermediate ordinance in May of 1959 which validly existed
until June of 1962 when modified.
The court stated that the word "interim" in the city's 1959
enactment did not control nor work to bring the enactment under
Chapter 62 of the Wisconsin Statutes. The nature of a zoning
ordinance was considered controlling by the court and not what it
is entitled.4" The nature of section 62.23 (7) (da) was construed as
that of a "stopgap" ordinance which neither reclassifies land nor
changes zoning restrictions. It merely freezes the right to make use
of the property effected only as it is presently used for a period of
not more than two years.4 7 This was distinguished from the intermediate zoning scheme adopted by the city of New Berlin which
permitted reasonable use of land within set classifications and thus
was not invalidated by operation of chapter 62.48
Where a comprehensive zoining ordinance is in effect a prop43. Gabe v. City of Cudahy, 52 Wis. 2d 13, 187 N.W.2d 874 (1971).
44. Wis. STAT. § 62.23 CITY PLANNING.
(7) ZONING.
(da) Interim zoning. The common council of any city which has not adopted a zoning
ordinance may, without referring the matter to the planning commission, enact an
interim zoning ordinance to preserve existing uses while the comprehensive zoning
plan is being prepared. Such ordinance may be enacted as is an ordinary ordinance
but shall be effective for no longer than 2 years after its enactment. (Emphasis
added).
This provision remains unchanged.
45. 58 Wis. 2d at 422, 206 N.W.2d at 209.
46. See Edelbeck v. Town of Thresa 57 Wis. 2d 172, 203 N.W.2d 694 (1973).
47. 58 Wis. 2d at 423, 206 N.W.2d at 210.
48. Id.
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erty owner may be required to have a conditional use permit authorized which allows him to use his land within the limits of the
existing ordinance but only when certain conditions have been met.
In State ex rel. Skelly Oil Co. v. Common Council, City of
Delafield" such a conditional use permit was requested by
appellant-Skelly Oil at a hearing before the City of Delafield Plan
Commission. This body rejected the request and pursuant to the
City of Delafield's ordinance Skelly Oil appealed to the Common
Council who eventually affirmed the Plan Commission's rejection.
By writ of certiorari the property owners petitioned the Waukesha
circuit court for a review of the Common Council's action. It was
specifically claimed by the petitioners that the common council of
a city is not, by statute, the correct body to review decisions of the
plan commission." The trial court did not agree and dismissed the
petitioners' action. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, reversed citing the clear and unambiguous language of section 62.23
(7) (e) of the 1971 Wisconsin Statutes. 51 This section, according to
the Wisconsin Supreme Court, vests exclusive authority in the
board of zoning appeals to pass upon conditional uses or special
exceptions and not the common council or plan commission. "2
It is important to note that even though the retention of zoning
authority by the Common Council and the Plan Commission of
Delafield was in direct derogation of state law the Wisconsin Supreme Court felt that in spite of section 62.23 (7) (e) of the Wisconsin Statutes "it may well be that such a procedure might be better
suited to the complicated task of providing for effective city planning."3
The case of Rogers v. Village of Menomonee Falls54 concerned
the issue as to who has standing to protest a proposed rezoning
ordinance. Even though the plaintiff-appellants were resident property owners adjacent to the property owned by the party seeking
49. 58 Wis. 2d 695, 207 N.W.2d 585 (1973).
50. Id. at 698, 207 N.W.2d at 588.
51. This section provides as follows:
(e) Board of appeals. 1. The council which enacts zoning regulations pursuant to this
section shall by ordinance provide for the appointment of a board of appeals, and
shall provide in such regulations that said board of appeals may, in appropriate cases
and subject to appropriate conditions and safeguards, make special exceptions to the
terms of the ordinance in harmony with its general purpose and intent and in accordance with general or specific rules therein contained.
52. 58 Wis. 2d at 703, 207 N.W.2d at 588.
53. Id. See also CUTLER, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE IN WISCONSIN, § 11, p. 37 (1967).
54. 55 Wis. 2d 563, 201 N.W.2d 29 (1972).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

the zoning change there standing to protest the rezoning was denied by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The controversy centered
around the construction of section 62.23 (7) (d) of the Wisconsin
Statutes.15 This section creates a permissible area of protest to
rezoning ordinances by allowing the landowners within its bounds
standing to challenge zoning changes. The appellants contended
that the 100 foot boundary line for protest should be construed as
extending 100 feet from the outermost limits of the property owned
by the party seeking the zoning change. The effect would be to put
the appellants in a position to protest the change. A contrary construction of the section, however, was adopted by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court. The party seeking the rezoning had left a 150 foot
strip between the outermost boundary of its property which bordered the appellants' property and the inner boundary of land
which was to be rezoned. The effect was to create a 150 foot
"buffer zone" which remained completely consistent with the zoning of the appellants property bordering it. The court held that the
100 foot area prescribed in section 62.23 (7) (d) extended from the
land which was to be rezoned thus placing the permissible area of
protest within the "buffer zone." In accordance with the express
language of the statute only landowners adjacent to the land rezoned and not those adjacent to the borders of a whole district in
which a specific area is being rezoned are valid protesters under
the statute. 6 The Wisconsin Supreme Court has previously rejected any interpretation of section 62.23 (7) (d) as embracing the
57
"district concept" for permissible protest.
55. The language of this statutory provision has remained unchanged in the 1971 Wisconsin Statutes. The pertinent language of § 62.23 (7) (d) allows for protest of rezoning
ordinances as follows:
In case of a protest against such change, duly signed and acknowledged by the owners
of 20% or more either of the areas of the land included in such proposed change, or
by the owners of 20% or more of the area of the land immediately adjacent extending
100 feet therefrom, or by the owners of 20% or more of the land directly opposite
thereto extending 100 feet from the street frontage of such opposite land such amendment shall not become effective except by the favorable vote of three-fourths of the
members of the council. (Emphasis added).
56. 55 Wis.2d at 567, 201 N.W.2d at 32.
57. See Prescher v. Wauwatosa, 34 Wis. 2d 421, 431, 149 N.W.2d 541, 546 (1967)
wherein the court stated:
The purpose of sec. 62.23 (7) (d), Stats., was to permit protest by landowners directly
affected by zoning changes. Landowners whose property borders on land to be
rezoned are directly affected because their land value and enjoyment of their property
decreases. People on the periphery of areas to be rezoned are not so directly affected.
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Eminent Domain
The appellants in Just" argued that the enforcement of the

zoning ordinance restricting the use of their land amounted to a
constructive taking and thus entitled them to compensation. It was

claimed that the zoning restrictions as applied to their property
caused a depreciation in the value of their land and that they should
be compensated for this "loss." 5 9 Stating that while loss of value
is to be considered in determining whether a restriction is a constructive taking of land the Wisconsin Supreme Court went on to

say that this was not a controlling factor where land value is inflated by development at the expense of harm to public rights."0
Furthermore, the court noted that the claimed depreciated value

was not based on the use ofthe land in its natural state but on what
the land would be worth if it could be filled and developed.
The court resolved the issue of whether there was a constructive
taking by stating:
The ordinance does not create or improve the public condition
but only preserves nature from the despoilage and harm resulting
from the unrestricted activities of humans."'

Thus the zoning ordinance was found to be well within the reasonable exercise of police power and did not create a public benefit in
2
the zoned land requiring compensation to be paid by the plaintiff.
In this context, to find a constructive taking, the court indicated it
is dependent upon whether "the restriction practically or substan6' 3
tially renders the land useless for all reasonable purposes.

Litigation arising in the area of eminent domain invariably
concerns the inadequacy of the compensation offered to the land-

owner-condemnee and the following case is no exception.
Bembinster v. State64 involved the quality of evidence that is
58. See supra n. I.
59. See Buhler v. Racine County, 33 Wis. 2d 137, 146 N.W.2d 403 (1966) wherein the
court held that the mere depreciation of property value was not a sufficient ground to enjoin
the county from enforcing a zoning ordinance. But see State v. Herning, 17 Wis. 2d 442,
117 N.W.2d 335 (1962) and Kamrowski v. State, 31 Wis. 2d 256, 142 N.W.2d 793 (1966)
where the court indicated that if the limitation on the use of land is in the nature of a taking
in whole or in part for public purposes, then the constitution requires compensation to be
paid to the property owner.
60. 56 Wis. 2d at 23, 201 N.W.2d at 771.
61. Id.
62. See text accompanying n.n. 36-37 supra.
63. Buhler, supra n. 59 at 143 and 146 N.W.2d at 406. See also Nick v. State Highway
Commission, 13 Wis. 2d 511, 109 N.W.2d 71, 111 N.W.2d 95 (1961).
64. 57 Wis. 2d 277, 203 N.W.2d 879 (1973).
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proper in a determination of just compensation in condemnation
proceedings. The Wisconsin Supreme Court stated the underlying
rule concerning assessment of compensation as follows:
It is well established that market value in an eminent - domain
proceeding is to be based not necessarily on the use to which
property was being put by its owner at the time of the taking but
rather on the basis of the highest and best use, present or prospective, for which it is adapted and to which it might in reason
be applied."5
Where, however, a zoning ordinance prohibits the most advantageous use of the property, the landowner's evidentiary burden in
proving "highest and best use" is increased.
Bembinster presented such a situation and the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the landowner may meet his burden by
showing there is a reasonable probability of rezoning so as to allow
for the "highest and best use." 66 The court stated that in proving a
rezoning so as to create a greater use one cannot use possibility or
an assumption 7 but must use facts justifying a reasonable probability of change.6"
C. Creditors' Rights
The issue in the first case, Exchange Corporationof Wisconsin
v. Kuntz,69 was whether a court of equity, in a strict foreclosure
action after the original period of redemption had expired, can
extend the time for which the vendee may relieve himself from
forfeiture. Exchange Corporation of Wisconsin (Exchange) as vendor brought suit for strict foreclosure of a land contract against the
vendee Arvin Kuntz. The judgment of foreclosure which was entered provided for a six month period of redemption ending June
1, 1971. Upon Kuntz' failure to redeem Exchange sought a writ
of assistance on July 6, 1971. At a subsequent hearing on July 26,
65. Id. at 283, 203 N.W.2d at 900. See e.g., Utech v. Milwaukee, 9 Wis. 2d 352, 101
N.W. 57 (1960) and Muscoda Bridge Co. v. Grant County, 200 Wis. 185, 227 N.W. 863
(1929).
66. 57 Wis. 2d at 284, 203 N.W.2d at 901.
67. See Hietpas v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 650, 130 N.W.2d 248 (1964).
68. See 57 Wis. 2d at 284-285, 203 N.W.2d at 901 wherein the court stated:
The type of evidence which has been admitted as material tending to prove a reasonable probability of change includes the granting of many variances which showed a
continuing trend that will render rezoning probable, the actual amendment of the
ordinance subsequent to the taking, and an ordinance rezoning neighboring property.
69. 56 Wis. 2d 555, 202 N.W.2d 393 (1972).
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197 1, the trial court ordered Kuntz to pay the balance on the land
contract before noon the day following and ordered Exchange to
convey by warranty deed the property to Kuntz.
The power and jurisdiction of the equity court to extend the
time of redemption was appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court
by Exchange. The court held that after the time for redemption had
expired the lower court was without power or jurisdiction to grant
an extension within which the vendee could make full payment of
the purchase price.70 Thus Exchange, the creditor on the land contract, could retake possession of the property free of all claims by
Kuntz.
It is important to note'that the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered it possible for a court in a strict foreclosure case to reserve
power to extend the period of redemption even after the original
period of redemption had expired. 7' This is contrary to the dicta
in St. Joseph's Hospitalv. Maternity Hospital,72 of which the court
in Exchange expressly disapproved.7 3
The holding in Mutual FederalS&L Assn. v. Wisconsin Wire
Works 74 explains Wisconsin's view of a mortgagee's right in mortgaged real estate when the mortgagor sells the land to a third party.
Since Wisconsin applies the lien theory to mortgages 75 the mortgagee is not considered to have legal title but is merely the holder of
a security interest or a lien holder. 7 Wisconsin Wire's interest, as
mortgagor, in the mortgaged property was subject to Mutual's
security interest. According to the Wisconsin Supreme Court when
Wisconsin Wire entered into a land contract the third party vendee,
by process of equitable conversion, became the owner of the land
in equity while Wisconsin Wire retained legal title to secure the
balance due on the purchase price from the vendee. 77 The equitable
title acquired by the vendee was held not only to remain subject to
70. Id. at 563, 202 N.W.2d at 397.
71. Id. at 561, 202 N.W.2d at 396.
72. 224 Wis. 422, 272 N.W.2d 669 (1937). The dicta contained therein stated essentially
that a court of equity has inherent jurisdiction after the expiration of the period of redemption to extend the redemption period even without reserving the right to do so.
73. 56 Wis. 2d at 562, 202 N.W.2d at 396.
74. 58 Wis. 2d 99, 205 N.W.2d 762 (1973). See the text accompanying n.83 et seq. infra
for further discussion of this case.
75. See Marshall & lisley Bank v. Greene, 227 Wis. 153, 278 N.W. 425, 115 A.L.R.
1030 (1938).
207
.
76. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES (Hornbook Series 2nd ed.) § 127 p.
Conversion in
Equitable
Church,
also.
See
765.
at
N.W.2d
205
77. 58 Wis. 2d at 104,
Wisconsin. 1970 Wis. L. REV. 404.
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the legal title possessed by Wisconsin Wire but also to the lien held
by Mutual.7 8
II.

CONVEYANCING

A. Real Estate Contracts
Many of the problems surrounding real estate contracts are
common to other contractual relationships. Assuming that a valid
contract exists questions may arise concerning the construction of
the contractual provisions. The following cases all involve specific
contract provisions which the court was required to construe.
The first reported case is Huntoon v. Capozza79 wherein the
vendors sought specific performance of a land contract. The vendee
claimed that the vendors had a contractual duty to utilize the value
of certain stocks they held as collateral in the event, as occurred
here, the vendee missed an installment payment. The land contract
provision relating to the stock stated it was to be deposited with
the vendor "as and for further security for the faithful carrying out
of the terms and conditions of the contract." Further, the stock,
according to the provision, was to be returned when the vendee had
fully performed all of the contract "terms, conditions, and covenants." In holding that the vendors did not have a contractual
obligation to utilize the value of the stock the Wisconsin Supreme
Court applied established construction principles." The express
terms of the contract were held sufficient to indicate the parties
intended the stock as security and not as a substitute installment
payment.
A different sort of construction problem was presented in
Peterson v. La May & Johnson."'The vendors sought the balance
due of the purchase price under a land contract from the assignees
of the purchaser. The vendors relied on a clause in the original
contract that purported to bind any assignee of the purchaser to
78. 58 Wis. 2d at 104, 205 N.W.2d at 765.
79. See supra n. 18 and accompanying text.
80. The court was guided by the following established principles as found in prior case
law. In the construction of contractual provisions the prevailing idea is to glean the intent
of the parties at the time such contract was executed. Aero Motive Sales Corp. v. Wausau
Motor Parts Company, 256 Wis. 586, 590, 42 N.W.2d 141, 143 (1950). Preferably this is
done by resorting to the contract itself. Green v. Donnor, 198 Wis. 122, 124, 223 N.W. 427,
428 (1929). Occasionally this is insufficient and other indications of the meaning of contractual provisions are utilized. See, e.g., H & R Truck Leasing Co. v. Allen, 26 Wis. 2d 158,
131 N.W.2d 912 (1965). Important contractual provisions are not ordinarily left to implication. Ratcliff v. Aspros, 254 Wis. 126, 129, 35 N.W.2d 217, 218 (1948).
81. See supra n. 30 and accompanying text.
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all the provisions within the contract. The La Mays, assignees of
the purchaser Johnson, were not privy to the original contract.
Because of this the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the La
Mays could not be bound by the original contract clause to pay
the purchase price. The court went on to say that in order for the
La Mays to be bound the assignment must have incorporated the
"purchase price" clause of the original contract. 2
Mutual Federal S&L Assn. v. Wisconsin Wire Works" involved the construction of clauses found in a mortgage and mortgage note. The mortgage was entered into by the respondent Wisconsin Wire, as mortgagor, and appellant Mutual, as mortgagee.
The mortgage note provided that it shall, at the option of Mutual,
become due and payable if Wisconsin Wire conveys away the property without Mutual's consent.84 The mortgage itself provided: "all
the terms and conditions of the note. . .are incorporated herein
• ..including duty to. . .have due date accelerated .... ,,15
Less
than two years later Wisconsin Wire, by a land contract, conveyed
the mortgaged property to Megal Development Corporation. Neither of the parties sought or obtained Mutual's consent to this
transaction causing the acceleration provisions of the mortgage to
be invoked. The loan to Wisconsin Wire became due and payable.
An action to foreclose the mortgage was commenced based solely
on the breach of the "due on conveyance" clause; at no time during
pendency of this lawsuit were the mortgage payments delinquent.
The trial court found the "consent - to - transfer" clause ambiguous and unclear and construed the note and mortgage against
Mutual. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that Wisconsin
Wire had not violated the terms of the mortgage and that the
balance due on the note was not to be accelerated.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in reversing the lower court,
concerned itself with the following areas: The nature of the lan82. 56 Wis. 2d at 150, 201 N.W.2d at 510.
83. See supra n. 74.
84. The clause and heading read as follows:
Consent Required to Transfer.
It is expressly understood and agreed, that this mortgage shall become due and
payable forthwith at the option of the Association if, at any time during this loan
the Promissors and Mortgagors shall convey away said mortgaged premises or if the
title thereto shall become vested in any other person or persons in any manner
whatsoever, unless the consent is in writing of the Association herein, or its successors or assigns, is first obtained. (Emphasis added).
58 Wis. 2d at 101, 205 N.W.2d at 764.
85. Id.
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guage contained in the mortgage note and whether or not the
acceleration clause of the type used in the mortgage was contrary
to public policy.
The specific language found ambiguous was the phrase "conveying away" contained in the "consent - to - transfer" clause of
the mortgage note. 8 The phrase was found to be ambiguous by the
trial court with respect to the scope of the restriction on conveyancing. Doubt was raised as to whether this restriction was intended
to limit the transfer of equitable title as well as legal title since only
equitable title was transferred to the land contract purchaser
Megal. 7 Using prevailing construction principles the Wisconsin
Supreme Court found the term "convey" to apply to any transfer
of title of mortgaged property whether legal or equitable. 88
Holding the phrase to be unambiguous the court then considered whether the due - on - sale acceleration clause or, to use the
term of the mortgage note, "due...if...convey(ed) away. . .or
if title thereto shall become vested in any other," was against
public policy. Prior Wisconsin cases have generally upheld the use
of acceleration clauses as not against public policy89 and the instant
holding is in accord. Mutual, however, states that the enforcement
of an acceleration clause is dependent upon whether or not its
invocation would be inequitable."
According to the Wisconsin Supreme Court the hazards that
may well accrue to the mortgagee if possession of mortgaged land
is allowed to be transferred to a subsequent purchaser who is a
stranger to the original security transaction are manifest. The
court cited strong public policy as supporting the due-on-sale acceleration clause to protect the mortgagee's senior security interest
from a junior encumbrance given by the mortgagor to a third
party.9
86. See supra n. 84.
87. See supra text accompanying n. 74.
88. 58 Wis. 2d at 105, 205 N.W.2d at 766.
89. Grootemaat v. Bertrand, 192 Wis. 519, 521, 213 N.W. 294, 295 (1927) wherein the
court discussed acceleration clauses generally saying:
• . . it may be said that such provisions are neither penalties nor forfeitures. They
are merely conditions of the contract entered into by the parties. They result only in
an acceleration of the time of payment. The duties and obligations of the mortgagors
remain the same. They must pay that which the mortgage was given to secure. By
reason of the terms of their own contract the time of payment has hastened.
90. 58 Wis. 2d at 106, 205 N.W.2d at 762.
91. Id. at 109, 205 N.W.2d at 768.
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B. Deeds
1. Boundaries
The action for ejectment in Beduhn v. Kolar 2 arose out of a
boundary dispute without equal. The Wisconsin Supreme Court,
in its holding, sought a definitive end to the controversy between
neighboring landowners of lake lots north and south of the disputed intervening parcel of land.13 The two adjoining lots were
originally part of a tract known as the "Feuerstein lot" with the
southern boundary of the land deeded to the plaintiff-respondent
Beduhns being described in terms of the northern boundary of the
defendant-appellant Kolars' lot. In 1966, the Kolars sought to determine the location of their northern lot line and in so doing it
was necessary that the original Feuerstein lot be reconstructed. The
surveyor who platted the property took the description in the old
Feuerstein deed and interpreted "south," "east" and "west" to
mean "due south," "due east" and "due west." The resultant survey described the Kolars' property as a rectangular area with an
east boundary 55.5 feet from the shoreline and extending due east
and west through a wooded lot claimed by the Beduhns and cutting
across the Beduhns' cottage lot. The Beduhns subsequently
brought suit for ejectment. As a result of the survey's placement
of the Kolars' lot, the Kolars' cottage, and their water well were
not part of the "resurveyed" property nor were they left with any
lakeshore. In character with this type of dispute the Kolarscontended that this did not matter because "the Beduhns must stand
on the strength of their deed and not on the weakness of their (the
Kolars') title."94 While the Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed that
the Kolars contention was a valid defense in ejectment actions they
held that the Beduhns' title was strong enough to support their
ejectment suit.
The difficulty in this case arose because of the literal interpretation given to the words "south," "east" and "west" as contained
in the Feuerstein deed. It was noted by the court that a less literal
interpretation of the directions would describe the lots as fitting the
land's topography and natural monuments. This less literal use, the
court held, was intended by the parties. Noting that the deed was
ambiguous and thus extrinsic evidence was admitted to ascertain
92. 56 Wis. 2d 471, 202 N.W.2d 272 (1973).
93. This case has had a rather tortured history of litigation through the courts. See 39
Wis. 2d 148, 158 N.W.2d 346 (1968).
94. 56 Wis. 2d at 476, 202 N.W.2d at 275.
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the intent of the parties the court said:
A description is not necessarily unambiguous because on paper
one can draw or illustrate the description. A description of land
is just what it purports to be, a word representation of boundaries
in reference to land, and to be unambiguous must reasonably fit
the topography of the land to which it refers when it uses natural
monuments. . . .[A] description which describes land in reference to natural monuments in part is ambiguous if there are
internal inconsistencies in laying it out, and thus extrinsic evidence is necessary.95
Since the deeds held by both the Kolars and Beduhns made
reference to the shoreland and gave riparian rights the court felt
that these references went to the very essence of a lake lot. That
they should not be over-ridden by a literal interpretation of a deed
description where the result is an unreasonable layout of the land
leaving no lake frontage.9 6 In ascertaining the intent of the parties
to resolve the ambiguity the court stated that "their use of the
words in the description in reference to the land" must be consid97
ered as controlling.
2.

Escrows
West FederalS&L Association v. Interstate Investment, Inc.9"
affirmed Wisconsin's long standing position concerning the legal
force of a deed held in escrow being delivered contrary to the
depository contract. It is generally held, in Wisconsin, as well as
other jurisdictions, that where a deed held in escrow is delivered
without satisfaction of the conditions of the escrow agreement no
valid deed passes. Many states, however, allow a valid deed to pass
where the rights of a bona fide purchaser have intervened. 9 Wisconsin does not follow this view and has long held that where there
was no negligence in selecting a depository, the improper delivery
by the escrow depository provides no protection to subsequent
bona fide purchasers.' West Federal reaffirms this principle.'0 '
95. Id. at 476-477, 202 N.W.2d at 275.
96. This is in accord with prior Wisconsin case law, holding that natural monuments
control over courses and distances. See, e.g., Timme v. Squires, 199 Wis. 178, 225 N.W.
825 (1929) and Du Pont v. Davis, 30 Wis. 170 (1872).
97. 56 Wis. 2d at 477, 202 N.W.2d at 275.
98. 57 Wis. 2d 690, 205 N.W.2d 361 (1967).
99. See 28 Am. JtJR. 2d Escrow, § 29 p. 42.
100. Franklin v. Killilea, 26 Wis. 88, 104 N.W. 993 (1905).
101. 57 Wis. 2d at 694. 205 N.W.2d at 363.
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3. Recording
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Mutual Federal v. Wiscon-

sin Wire Works, 0 2 upheld Mutual's enforcement of the "due on
sale" clause which was invoked as a result of Wisconsin Wire's
conveyance of mortgaged property to Megal Development without
Mutual's consent. 113 Wisconsin Wire, however, argued that Mutual had constructive notice of the conveyance by virtue of the
recordation of the land contract by Megal. In so claiming, Wisconsin Wire contended that because of the recording Mutual had notice but failed to exercise their contractual rights for two and onehalf years causing Mutual's acceleration rights to lapse. The essence of this line of argument is that the subsequent recording of
the land contract could effect the rights of Mutual, a prior encumbrancer, since recording is "notice to all the world." The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, held that the effect of the recording
statute was nearly the converse of Wisconsin Wire's position. As
a result Mutual was not charged with notice of Megal's subsequent
recordation but rather Mutual's recorded mortgage was considered
notice to Megal, the land contract vendee, that it took the land
subsequent to a mortgage. 104
RICHARD

A.

STACK, JR.

TAXATION
I.

PRIMARY JURISDICTION OF THE TAX APPEALS COMMISSION

The authority of the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission was
examined and clarified in Sawejka v. Morgan.' Administrative
review of Wisconsin tax matters, before 1969, was performed by
the Board of Tax Appeals whose function was restricted solely to
reviewing applications for abatement and claims for refund.2 The
Board's jurisdiction was later expanded to review "all questions of
law and fact" arising out of determinations by the secretary of the
102. See supra n. 74.
103. See supra n. 84.
104. 58 Wis. 2d at 112, 205 N.W.2d at 770.
I. 56 Wis. 2d 70, 201 N.W.2d 528 (1972).
2. Createdby Wis. Laws 1939, ch. 412, to perform quasi-judicial functions. Wis. STAT.
§ 73.01(6)(c), renumbered § 73.01(5)(c) by Wis. Laws 1969, ch 276, sec. 333; Kaukauna v.
Department of Taxation, 250 Wis. 196, 26 N.W.2d 637 (1947).

